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OVERVIEW
in urban water services. But the partner is silent no
more.
At least not in Atlanta, Indianapolis,
Chattanooga, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, or in many
other places.
Financial, regulatory, and citizen
pressures are causing city after city to investigate and, in
some cases, implement partnerships with private firms.
Often, these arrangements are eagerly sought by
political leaders as a quick solution to their problems.

Background
The 1999 Annual Meeting of the Universities Council
on Water Resources, held at Kamuela, Hawaii, included
a full day of papers and discussion on issues associated
with privatizing urban water and wastewater utilities.1
This is a topic of intense interest to many of those
operating municipal utilities, and one that has stimulated
heated debate in the public policy, resource
management, and academic communities. The issues
are neither straightforward nor obvious. Even the usual
name for this phenomenon – “privatization” – is
misleading. In fact, the debate is concerned with a wide
variety of strategies involving various combinations of
public and private sector roles. Early exchanges
between proponents and opponents of increased private
sector participation were often marked by mutual
accusations of blind ideology and/or self interest.
Predictably, little information was exchanged in such an
intellectual climate.

But this is uncharted territory for the great majority of
water professionals and academics. After spending
whole careers in a relatively stable industry, where
public-to-private ownership or operating transfers were
rare and unremarkable, many find the evolving menu of
options daunting, if not confusing. It is difficult to
know what the key issues are, much less how to analyze
them. The 1999 technical session at the Hawaii meeting
was intended to begin a process of education for
UCOWR members, one that has been well received so
far. This issue of Water Resources Update is intended
to continue that education process.

But the phenomenon under discussion is a real one of
considerable current interest. Investor-owned water and
wastewater utilities have existed in the United States
since the beginnings of the respective industries.
Private sector participation in the form of contracted
services also has a long history. What is new is a
greater awareness of the many possible flavors of
“privatization” and an apparent willingness to look
more closely at the advantages and disadvantages of
alternative approaches to providing water services.

Summary
The papers in this volume have been selected to provide
a range of perspectives and emphases, and above all to
be both provocative and useful. But, taken as a whole,
they are not comprehensive. There are issues and points
of view that are not represented here. Still, the coverage
is considerable.
Paul Seidenstat has conducted extensive studies of the
opportunities for privatizing traditional government
services, including water and wastewater. In this
volume, he provides a balanced and careful presentation
of the various forms of private sector participation in the
water industry. He also describes approaches that have
been taken to inject competitive behavior into an
industry that is fundamentally monopolistic.

This relatively sudden flowering of interest follows
decades of inattention. Transfers between government
and private sector ownership or operation were
infrequent, attracting little attention beyond the affected
communities. For many years, the investor-owned
segment of the water industry had been roughly constant
at about 14 percent of population served. The investorowned segment of the wastewater industry was
generally considered to be negligible. In fact, the
private sector could be described as the “silent partner”

Seidenstat is followed by Janice Beecher, who is widely
known for her close attention to the public regulation of
investor owned utilities. Here she approaches the
privatization issue from the perspective of public policy,
laying out the challenges presented by the contract
operations and private ownership models of
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utilities in the 1980s. He notes rather different results in
different industries, ranging from apparent success in
gas, electricity, and telecom industries to chaos in the
railroads. In the water and wastewater industry, the
picture is much cloudier, including public discontent
with large tariff increases, little evidence of operational
efficiencies, and general disappointment with the
efficacy of regulation.

privatization. Various means of addressing those
challenges are discussed, ranging from conventional
economic regulation to structured competition.
Adrian Moore argues effectively for long-term
contractual relationships between public agencies and
private sector operators, pointing out a number of
advantages over short-term arrangements. He believes
that properly structured long-term contracts can lead to
significant gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of
utility operations. However, he also mentions several
concerns, as well as a number of research needs.

Even this skeletal summary of these papers must
suggest a topic with many layers, nuances, perspectives,
and details. After reading this volume, no one will
believe that their education in these matters is complete.
However, we do hope that what follows is a useful
beginning.

Alan Manning and Dave Mason approach the subject
from a completely different perspective. They argue
that the instances of superior performance by private
sector organizations result from a fundamentally
different mindset -- one that is business-driven and
antithetical to the monopolistic thinking characteristic of
government operations. Manning and Mason argue that
the performance of government organizations can be
dramatically improved by interventions designed to
change the culture and mindset -- to replace
monopolistic thinking with business-driven “New
Think” attitudes.

CONTEXT
In considering any change in ownership or operating
responsibility for water or wastewater service, it is
necessary to consider expected changes in the user
tariffs. This is not the only decision criterion, of course,
but it is one that often assumes great importance. Most
of the authors in this volume make reference to impacts
on user charges. But fees and charges paid by
consumers do not arise directly from economic
efficiency, or lack of it. They do not depend directly on
private sector/public sector choices, on management
incentives, on accountability, or on many of the other
improvements identified here as worthy of attention.
User tariffs are designed to match revenues to revenue
requirements, and as such are based on accounting data.
Certainly, many aspects of ownership, management, and
finance ultimately determine those accounting data, but
the differences between government-owned and
investor-owned ratemaking are more extensive. Del
Gardner raises this issue, using data from several Utah
utilities. But comparisons made in his and other papers
suggest a need for a more detailed exposition.

On the other hand, Del Gardner reminds the reader of
the inherent power of the private sector profit incentive
to force efficient and socially desirable behavior. Using
data taken from four water systems in Utah, he points to
evidence for greater efficiency in the private sector
operations. But, at the same time, he documents explicit
discrimination in favor of public sector operations, in
the form of tax relief and subsidized capital costs.
Gardner concludes that taxes and subsidies should be
uniformly applied to public and private water operators.
At the time of the 1999 UCOWR meeting in Hawaii,
Jim Roumasset served as Rapporteur for the
privatization technical session. He has kindly provided
an edited version of his Rapporteur’s Report, which
provides a cogent summary of the presentations at that
session (some of which are not represented here), and
Roumasset’s own observations.

Accordingly, some illustrative accounting data are
presented here. Revenue and expense statements are
summarized for two utilities identical in every way
except for ownership and resulting regulatory treatment.
For various reasons, it is convenient to approach this
comparison by taking actual data from an investorowned utility, then modifying those data to simulate a
hypothetical government-owned utility. The original
data, for a recent year, are generally based on actual
results for a small water and wastewater utility serving a
community of about 4,000 persons in a Middle Atlantic
state. The utility is and always has been investorowned. It is subject to rate of return regulation by the
relevant state commission. In adjusting financial results
to simulate a government-owned operation, a number of
assumptions are required. These are discussed below.

Two shorter, more personal comments are included in
this volume. Robert K. Davis draws on a lifetime of
experience with water management -- serving at various
times as a researcher, academic, advocate, and
government official. Citing a number of formative
experiences from that career, he argues strenuously for
the economic and practical common sense of private
sector participation in the water and wastewater
industries.
Charles Howe provides a valuable
counterpoint by reflecting on the experience of Great
Britain since the near-universal privatization of public
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some taxes, or make payments in lieu of taxes. But the
assumption used here is consistent with the more
general case of no tax payments.

Operating Revenue
The operating revenue for the investor-owned utility
reflects a tariff adopted pursuant to a recent regulatory
order. The rates and charges have been set in
accordance with the allowed rate of return on rate base.
However, since the new tariff level is significantly
different from the one in effect just before the change,
water use has been adjusted slightly downward
consistent with the expected price elasticity of demand.
Rates, charges, number of connections, and adjusted
water use then produce the operating revenue.

Cost of Capital
Investor-owned water and wastewater utilities typically
obtain capital from three sources: customer
contributions (connection fees, retained earnings, etc.),
debt (e.g., long-term mortgage bonds), and equity
(funds contributed by shareholders). The amounts of
capital in use by the investor-owned utility are
approximately $3.2 million in customer contributions,
$1.2 million in debt, and $1.1 million in equity. Total
capital is, therefore, $5.5 million.

In the case of the government-owned utility, operating
and maintenance expenses and other costs are used to
calculate the revenue requirement. It is assumed that
operating revenue will equal the revenue requirement.
This implies the further assumption that the government
utility has adjusted the tariff so as to compensate for any
price elasticity effect. This may result in higher water
use than in the case of investor-owned operation, which
would require upward adjustment to variable operating
cost (and, possibly, to capital costs), but these secondorder adjustments have not been made here.

The state regulatory commission does not permit the
investor-owned utility to depreciate or earn a return on
customer contributions. Therefore, the cost of this form
of capital is zero. The cost of debt is the annual interest
expense (10 percent). Because of the workings of rate
of return regulation, it can be assumed that the net cash
flow actually returned to shareholders approximates the
cost of equity (about 12.4 percent).

Operating and Maintenance Expenses
The government-owned utility is assumed to have the
same invested capital ($5.5 million), and the same
customer contributions ($3.2 million). The remaining
$2.3 million is assumed to be financed by debt, in this
case government revenue bonds, with an effective
interest rate of 7 percent. So the total cost of capital to
the government utility is $161,000 per year.

Much of the discussion in this volume addresses the
efficiencies that a profit-oriented private sector operator
may bring to water and wastewater service. It is widely
believed that privatization will result in lower operating
costs and lower maintenance costs. However, despite
substantial anecdotal evidence, there is little in the way
of careful analysis to provide quantitative support for
this belief. Accordingly, the government-owned utility
in this example will be assumed to have the same
operating and maintenance costs as the investor-owned
system. In this way, the reader can consider the overall
impact of various levels of efficiency gain with the aid
of simple mathematics.

Comparison
Table 1 shows the revenues and expenses for the two
utilities being compared. The first line contains the end
result: the revenue requirement for the governmentowned utility ($757,500) is only 75 percent of the
revenue collected by the investor-owned utility.
Depending on how the tariff is designed, this could
translate into water prices a full 25 percent below those
charged by the private sector utility. But in order to
understand this result, it is necessary to look at the
causes for such a large discrepancy, and to look at
factors that may mitigate the difference.

Taxes and Regulatory Expense
It is assumed here that the government-owned utility is
unregulated and that it pays no property, gross receipts,
franchise, inventory, or income taxes. Therefore, all
items in this category are zero for the government
utility. Note that some government-owned utilities pay
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Table 1: Revenue and Cost Comparisons for Alternative Ownerships
Actual Investor- Owned
Utility
1,004,000

Hypothetical
Government-Owned
Utility
757,500

74,300

74,300

Fixed operating expense

288,900

288,900

Maintenance expense

144,700

144,700

Depreciation expense

88,600

88,600

596,500

596,500

Operating Revenue (from user charges)
Expenses
Variable operating expense

Total expenses
Other

7,700

0

Income taxes

Rate case expense (amortized)

89,100

0

Taxes other than income

59,400

0

156,200

0

251,300

161,000

115,200

161,000

136,100

0

251,300

161,000

0

0

Total other
Utility Operating Income
(Revenue less Expenses less Other)
Cost of Capital
Interest expense
Net cash flow to owner
Total Cost of Capital
Balance

The remaining item is the $90,300 reduction in the cost
of capital. There are a number of reasons for this
difference: interest payments to holders of government
bonds are partially or entirely exempt from income tax,
so these bonds can be sold with significantly smaller
yields; governments diversify risk much better than
private sector corporations, so interest rates have low
risk premiums; there are no equity holders in the
government operation, so no part of the capital return
will be subject to individual income tax or to investors’
risk premiums. These effects describe a mixture of
transfers (tax exemptions) and efficiency gains (risk
diversification), with the transfers probably explaining
the largest part of the apparent savings.

The difference in calculated revenue requirements is
$246,500. The largest part of this is due to exemption
from taxes. Income and other taxes not paid by the
government operator total $148,500. This does not
represent an efficiency gain for government ownership,
it is simply a transfer not made. In more pragmatic
terms, if the local government were to acquire the
privately owned utility described here, all levels of
government would lose $148,500 in tax income. This
would be ultimately recovered by either increasing tax
rates or other taxes, or reducing government services, or
both. On balance, the customers of this utility may be
better off, but society as a whole is not.
Regulatory expenses are also avoided by the
government operator in this example. If it can be
assumed that the government sets tariffs and terms of
service that are not markedly inferior to those that
would be set by a regulatory commission, then this
avoided expense represents an efficiency gain for public
ownership. It is, however, small ($7,700).

Altogether, of the $246,500 difference in revenue
requirements, some amount more than $200,000 can be
explained by transfers required of the investor-owned
utility but not required of the same utility when owned
by government. As noted by Del Gardner, this
constitutes “explicit discrimination” in favor of
government ownership. The balance, probably at least
$20,000, represents true efficiency gains attributable to
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• There are possible efficiency gains that are unique to
government operation (avoided regulatory expense
and risk diversification). But in this example, these
gains are relatively small, well within the range of
potential efficiency gains commonly attributed to
private sector operation.

government operation (avoided regulatory expense and
risk diversification).
But most of the papers in this volume speak of
efficiency gains attributable to private sector operation.
To the extent that these efficiencies are present in the
investor-owner utility described here, and are not
reproducible by the alternative government operator,
then operating and maintenance costs for government
operation should be increased, along with the resulting
revenue requirement.

• The taxes and other transfers required of investorowned utilities are relatively large and constitute
economic discrimination in favor of government
ownership. In this example, the private operator
must have realized efficiency gains on the order of
36 percent to compensate for this discrimination.

In this example, depreciation expense is not subject to
reduction, and variable operating expense may be
relatively independent of operator efficiency (it consists
of electric power and chemical costs). The remaining
operating and maintenance costs total $433,600. If the
private sector operator is 5 percent more efficient in
these areas, then the required increase in O&M costs for
the government operator would roughly balance the
efficiency gains attributed above to government
operation. In order to mitigate both the government
efficiency gains and the effect of the transfers required
of the private operator, the government O&M costs
would have to be increased to $680,100, implying that
the private operator has realized efficiency gains on the
order of 36 percent.

• In situations similar to the one described here, it
appears very likely that a government operator can
offer lower tariff levels than the investor-owned
alternative, even in the presence of fairly substantial
efficiency gains by the private operator.
But, as noted above, tariff level is not the entire story,
nor are the results just noted the end of any story. This
is simply offered as context for the much broader and
better-elaborated papers to follow.
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economics from Johns Hopkins University, as well as
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administration. Prior to entering academic life, he held
management positions at an urban water utility and a
regional water/wastewater utility. He has worked in the
field of urban water supply for more than 35 years,
serving as consultant at every level of government and
in more than 20 countries.

Conclusions
This example is, of course, a single observation, not
necessarily representative of the industry. But the data
are taken from an actual utility, and they are not
considered atypical or particularly distorted by any
other factor. Several things can be concluded from this
comparison:
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